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Abstract
The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe
are finely-tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values
life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will
present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other
versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such
that the fine-tuning argument doesn’t lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of
God.
21. Introduction.
This paper is about the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God, which runs roughly as
follows:
(P1) The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our
universe (such as the masses of the fundamental particles and the strength ratios between the
fundamental forces) are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had
slightly different values life could not exist. (I will call this “the fine-tuning evidence”.)
(C1) It would be very unlikely for the universe to have life-permitting fundamental constants
by chance (from P1).
(P2) If God created the universe, we would expect it to be life-permitting.
(C) Thus, probably God created the universe (from C1, P2).
This paper has two main theses. I will argue that the specific version of the fine-tuning
argument I will present below is stronger than all other versions in the literature. I will show that
the fine-tuning argument is best presented using a subjectivist interpretation of probability;
objections to the fine-tuning argument which rely on a frequentist or logical interpretation of
probability are flawed. Nevertheless, I am not a proponent of the fine-tuning argument. My
second thesis is that one can have reasonable opinions such that the fine-tuning argument doesn’t
lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of God. This doesn’t count as a full-
scale refutation of the fine-tuning argument, since I admit that one can have reasonable opinions
such that the argument does lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of God. But
I believe that no stronger reply to the fine-tuning argument is successful. 
32. Teleological Arguments.
The fine-tuning argument is one version of the teleological argument for the existence of God. I
will now present a brief history of teleological arguments, for two reasons. First, the history will
help us to better understand the fine-tuning argument, by situating it in context. Second. the fine-
tuning argument is, in my opinion, the only viable teleological argument; a review of the history
will allow us to see how the other teleological arguments are flawed.
The teleological argument goes back at least to Aquinas’s Fifth Way:
“We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end ...
Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end.”
Aquinas’s argument has some force in the context of Aristotelian physics, where natural bodies
move in a goal-directed fashion, such as by going to their natural places. Now that Aristotelian
physics has been replaced with a physics that does not involve teleology, Aquinas’s argument
loses its force.
Probably the best-known version of the teleological argument is given by William Paley
(1800). Paley gives an argument by analogy: just as, when one comes across a complex object
like a watch, one infers a designer, so when one comes across a complex biological object like
the human eye, one should also infer a designer. Paley’s argument is generally taken to be
refuted by Darwin; it’s generally thought that evolution can account for the existence of complex
living things. 
Creationists have argued against evolution on various fronts. The two I find most prima
facie plausible are as follows. One is that evolution can give no plausible account of the origin of
life (in the form of self-replicating molecules) from non-life. The other (famously promulgated
4by Behe 1996) is that some structures in microbiology are so sophisticated that they would not
be expected to arise via gradualistic evolutionary processes. 
An important and underappreciated point is that both these objections to evolution can be
refuted once one recognizes that the universe is spatially infinite. Empirical measurements of the
global curvature of spacetime suggest that spacetime is globally flat, which entails that the
universe is spatially infinite. (See for example Bahcall et. al. 1999 for details.) Also, the basic
theory of inflationary cosmology is now widely accepted, and inflationary cosmology strongly
suggests that the universe is spatially infinite. (See for example Guth 2000, 571 or Garriga and
Vilenkin 2001 for details.) There is no reason to think that what exists in distant, unobserved
regions of space is substantially different from what exists in this region of space, so it is
reasonable to infer that stars and planets exist in those regions of space as well. 
Now, let us grant to the creationist that it is very improbable that self-replicating
molecules and sophisticated microbiological structures would arise by chance on Earth. With an
infinite number of planets, though, as long as the range of initial conditions varies sufficiently
across the different planets, one would fully expect life to arise. (In fact, one would fully expect
life to arise on an infinite number of planets. For discussion of this point, see for example Ellis
and Brundrit 1979.) So even if the steps needed to account for the existence of life are very
improbable ones, we should still fully expect them to happen somewhere.
The creationist who appreciates that the universe is spatially infinite might be compelled
to respond: what made it the case that the universe is spatially infinite? Why are there stars and
planets at all? Why does our universe have fundamental constants that allow for stars, planets,
and the existence of life? This brings us to the fine-tuning version of the teleological argument. 
1If one prefers, the proposition G can be taken to include the possibility that some
supernatural designer exists, without that designer having all the attributes we would attribute to
God. I mention this possibility because some proponents of intelligent design are at pains to
maintain that they are not arguing for the existence of God, but just for the existence of a
designer. In the case of the fine-tuning argument, that designer would be a designer of the
universe, so would presumably have to at least be supernatural. 
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There’s a sense in which this move to the fine-tuning version of the teleological argument
brings us back to Aquinas. While the teleological argument is often understood in a biological
context (following Paley), Aquinas presented the argument in a physics context, focussing on
natural bodies. I will argue that, just as Aquinas’s version of the teleological argument is
unsuccessful, so too is the fine-tuning version of the teleological argument. 
3. The Fine-Tuning Argument.
The basic version of the fine-tuning argument I will be discussing in this paper is as
follows. (The fine-tuning argument is presented in this sort of way by for example Swinburne
(1990, 155), Le Poidevin (1996, 47-8), Collins (1999, 57), Holder (2002, 298-9), and Manson
(2003, 7). There are other versions of the fine-tuning argument in the literature, but I will be
focussing on this one.)
Let L be the proposition that the universe is life-permitting, and let G be the proposition
that God exists.1 According to proponents of the fine-tuning argument, L provides epistemic
support for G. A standard way of understanding the claim that L provides epistemic support for
G is to say that learning that L increases one’s probability for G: P(G|L) > P(G). Proponents of
the fine-tuning argument argue that this inequality holds, since P(L|G) > P(L), and by Bayes’
Theorem:
6P(G|L) / P(G) =  P(L|G) / P(L). 
Why is it that case that P(L|G) > P(L)? That claim is equivalent to: 
P(L|G) > P(L|G) P(G) + P(L|~G) P(~G). 
Proponents of the fine-tuning argument maintain that P(L|G) > P(L|~G), and it follows that
P(L|G) > P(L) (because P(L) is a weighted average of P(L|G) and a quantity less than P(L|G)).
Why is it the case that P(L|G) > P(L|~G); why is it more probable that the universe is life-
permitting under the supposition that God exists than under the supposition that God doesn’t?
Here is where proponents of the fine-tuning argument appeal to the evidence of fine-tuning.
They argue that, for various fundamental constants, such as the constant representing the
strength of the gravitational force, and the constant representing the proton/neutron mass
difference, these constants have to have a value in a relatively narrow range in order for life to
exist. (For a nice up-to-date discussion of these fine-tuning claims, see Collins 2003.) Proponents
of the fine-tuning argument then argue that, if the fundamental constants of the universe were
selected naturalistically (via an objectively chancy process, for example), one would expect the
constants to be such that the universe is not life-permitting. But if the constants were selected
supernaturalistically, one would expect the universe to be life-permitting (because God would
pick the constants so as to guarantee the existence of life). It follows that P(L|G) > P(L|~G), and
thus P(G|L) > P(G), as desired.
4. Frequentist vs. Logical vs. Subjective Probability.
In the previous section, I presented the fine-tuning argument utilizing a probability function P,
but I did not specify what concept of probability this function was meant to represent. I will now
7consider three interpretations of probability, and show that the fine-tuning argument is different
depending on which interpretation of probability one chooses. Specifically, I will show that on
frequentist interpretation, the fine-tuning argument is clearly unsuccessful; on a logical
interpretation, it’s an open question whether the fine-tuning argument is successful; while on a
subjective interpretation, the fine-tuning argument looks more promising. 
First, consider a frequentist analysis of probability, where the probability for an event is
determined by the actual frequency with which the event has occurred in past trials. For
example, on a frequentist interpretation, the probability of a fair coin landing heads is about 1/2
because out of all coin-flips with these sort of coins in the past, about half of those coin flips
landed heads. Elliot Sober (2003, 49) criticizes the fine-tuning argument, saying that “the
argument from fine-tuning can’t be defended as a claim about probabilities.” But his criticism
relies on something like the frequentist interpretation of probability, and he gives no argument to
defend that choice of interpretation.
Sober’s criticism is short and straightforward. He says that “we have neither theory nor
data on which to ground” the claim that P(G|L) > P(G). He concludes that the fine-tuning
argument “makes claims about probabilities that we have no reason to accept” (2003, 48-9). To
justify his claim that we have neither theory nor data to establish the probabilities, he contrasts
the fine-tuning argument with the firing squad example (Leslie 1989, 13-15), where a prisoner
finds himself alive after the marksmen shoot. Sober maintains that in the firing squad example,
when the prisoner finds himself alive, he should increase his probability for the hypothesis that
the marksmen intended to miss.  The reason this is the case, he says, is that “we have frequency
data and our general knowledge of human behavior on which to ground” the probability shift.
8The firing-squad example is meant to be analogous to the fine-tuning argument: just as the
prisoner’s being alive is more likely under the design hypothesis than under the chance
hypothesis, so the universe-being life-permitting is ostensibly more likely under the design
hypothesis than under the chance hypothesis. But Sober rejects this analogy, because he
maintains that we have no such frequency data or general knowledge in the case of the fine-
tuning argument. 
Sober concludes the section of his paper where he discusses these issues by saying that
not only do we have no reason to accept the fine-tuning argument’s claims about probability,
“we cannot even understand them as objective claims about nature” (2003, 49). I maintain that
the fine-tuning argument is unfairly weakened if it is saddled with the requirement that its
probability claims must be objective claims about nature. Sober is clearly right that we have no
frequency data on the proportion of life-permitting universes, and perhaps he is also right that we
have no theory which can enable us to make objective claims about the probability of a universe
being life-permitting. But these considerations are not sufficient to set aside the fine-tuning
argument. There is no requirement in the fine-tuning argument that its claims about probability
be understood as objective claims about nature.
On the subjectivist interpretation of probability, one’s probability for a proposition
represents one’s personal degree of belief that that proposition is true. On the subjectivist
interpretation, the fine-tuning argument would be successful for an agent, as long as that agent’s
subjective probabilities are such that P(G|L) > P(G). (I will discuss in detail how this reasoning
is meant to work in the next section.) Thus, the fine-tuning argument utilizing the subjectivist
interpretation of probability is more promising than the fine-tuning argument utilizing the
2Robin Le Poidevin (1996, 49-57) objects to the fine-tuning argument in a way similar to
Sober: Le Poidevin considers only the frequency and propensity theories of probability, and
argues that on either theory “it makes no sense to talk of the probability of a life-sustaining
universe in the absence of God” (1996, 57). My reply to Sober carries over to Le Poidevin. 
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frequentist interpretation, because on the subjectivist interpretation there is at least hope that one
can have probability assignments such that the argument is successful.2 
I will now show that the fine-tuning argument fares better on the subjectivist
interpretation of probability than it does on the logical interpretation. On the logical
interpretation of probability, probabilities are determined through a priori reasoning, such as
reasoning in accordance with the Principle of Indifference. Timothy McGrew, Lydia McGrew,
and Eric Vestrup (2001) (henceforth MMV) treat the fine-tuning argument as utilizing the
logical interpretation, and present an emphatic critique of the fine-tuning argument interpreted in
this way. They assume that the fine-tuning argument utilizes the Principle of Indifference, and
thus attribute to proponents of the fine-tuning argument the view that it is unreasonable to
assume that one sort of universe is more probable a priori than any other sort. They then
conclude that the fine-tuning argument can’t be coherently formulated, since the space of
possible values of constants for universes is infinite, and hence non-normalizable. They say that
“Probabilities make sense only if the sum of the logically possible disjoint alternatives adds up to
one” (MMV, 203), but that’s not possible for a non-normalizable space of possibilities where
each possibility is treated the same. Either each possibility will be assigned probability 0, in
which case the total will be 0, or each possibility will be assigned some fixed positive
probability, in which case the total will be infinite. They take this reply to succeed in
“demolishing” (MMV, 207) the fine-tuning argument. 
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In my opinion, MMV are making too much of a technical issue in probability theory.
Indeed, work has been done on resolving this technical issue. Peter Vallentyne (2000), for
example, has come up with a sophisticated yet natural way of making comparative probability
judgements, even when the various possibilities being compared all have probability 0. I won’t
go into Vallentyne’s solution here; I will just note as a potential problem that what motivates
Vallentyne’s work is simply the intuition that probability judgements should make sense even
when the probabilities for the various disjoint possibilities don’t sum to one (that is, when
countable additivity fails). It follows that it would be open to MMV to reject Vallentyne’s
solution by rejecting that intuition. I conclude that it is an open question whether the fine-tuning
argument on the logical interpretation is promising. 
The fine-tuning argument on the subjectivist interpretation has various benefits over the
fine-tuning argument on the logical interpretation. One benefit is that on the subjectivist
interpretation, one need not rely on the Principle of Indifference. One is open to assign zero
probability to some possible values of constants, and non-zero probability to other possible
values. It follows that the probabilities assigned to the various disjoint possibilities can sum to
one. Another benefit is that on the subjective interpretation, one need not even bother to assign
probabilities to the various possible values of constants; one can just assign a probability to the
proposition L that the universe is life-permitting. There is no need to generate one’s probabilities
in any sort of foundational way, by for example assigning probabilities to each element in the
possibility space. As long as the probability assignments one does make are probabilistically
coherent, that is enough to satisfy the constraints of the subjective probability interpretation. The
reason it matters that on the subjectivist interpretation, one need not assign probabilities to the
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various possible values of constants, is that such probability assignments aren’t needed to
generate the fine-tuning argument. This can be seen by looking at the presentation of the
argument in the previous section. 
Once one moves to the subjectivist interpretation, one allows for an agent to have her
personal probability function be such that P(G|L) > P(G), but one also allows for an agent to
have her personal probability function be such that P(G|L) = P(G). For the strongest defense of
the fine-tuning argument, one would have to argue that only probability functions which are such
that P(G|L) > P(G) are reasonable ones; all other probability functions are unreasonable. For a
weaker defense, one could simply argue that for a wide class of agents, it’s actually the case that
their probability functions are such that P(G|L) > P(G). I will now discuss MMV’s criticism of
subjectivist interpretation, which takes issue with these two lines of defense.
MMV are aware that their critique of the fine-tuning argument could be criticized for
relying on a non-subjective account of probability, and so they go on the offensive against the
subjectivist interpretation. They write:
in our opinion it is profoundly unsatisfying to stipulate that we can just “tell” which
[probability] functions are reasonable and which are not. Reasonable people have
conflicting intuitions here. ... If, at a critical point, the [fine-tuning] argument turns on a
subjectively variable sense of which assessments of probabilities are reasonable, a sense
that cannot be adjudicated in terms of any more fundamental criteria, then the [fine-
tuning argument] is effectively forceless.  (MMV, 206)
There is something rhetorically strange about this criticism. MMV, by their lights, have just
shown that the fine-tuning argument on the logical interpretation is demolished. One is then led
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to ask whether the fine-tuning argument would fare any better on a different interpretation of
probability. MMV proceed to reject the subjectivist interpretation, because the fine-tuning
argument would be weak on that interpretation. But then why not reject the logical interpretation
too? If those are the only two interpretations on the table, and one is being charitable to the fine-
tuning argument, then one should focus on how the fine-tuning argument fares on the
interpretation that is most promising. On the subjectivist interpretation, as MMV implicitly
admit, the argument is not demolished; the argument would go through for those agents who
happen to have subjective probability functions such that P(G|L) > P(G).
There is a more substantive problem with MMV’s criticism too. MMV suggest that we
should not expect agreement on which subjective probability functions are reasonable and which
aren’t. But in fact, for many cases there is widespread agreement about such matters. For
example, any reasonable person would reject a probability function which held that the sky being
blue provides evidence that the moon is made of green cheese. It would be worth examining
whether there is similar widespread agreement that only probability functions which are such
that P(G|L) > P(G) are reasonable. This is precisely what I will do later in this paper. 
Nevertheless, there is something correct about MMV’s criticism. It is the case that, on the
subjectivist interpretation, there is no way to ensure that all reasonable, rational agents have the
same probability function. But this is just the way the world is; different people have different
opinions about things, even when the people are all being reasonable and rational. The point of
the subjectivist interpretation is to probabilistically represent rational people’s actual opinions;
the point is not to see what probabilities are generated when one applies ostensibly a priori
principles like the Principle of Indifference. 
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To sum up: I have argued that the fine-tuning argument utilizing a subjectivist
interpretation of probability is more promising than the fine-tuning argument utilizing a
frequentist or logical interpretation of probability. My arguments have been parochial ones, in
the sense that they have mostly focussed on the implications of the various interpretations for the
fine-tuning argument. A different way to debate the merits of the various interpretations for the
fine-tuning argument would be to debate the merits of the various interpretations themselves. For
example, I believe that the frequentist interpretation should be rejected because we sometimes
assign probabilities in the absence of frequency data, and the logical interpretation should be
rejected because at least sometimes there are multiple rational yet conflicting ways to apply
ostensibly a priori principles like the Principle of Indifference. But these issues are part of a huge
debate in the literature, and to engage in that debate is beyond the scope of this paper. This
section is simply designed to show that the fine-tuning argument is most promising on the
subjectivist interpretation of probability. Nevertheless, the fine-tuning argument on the
subjectivist interpretation has a problem of its own; it is to this issue that I now turn.
5. The Problem of Old Evidence.
Given that one takes the subjective probability approach to the fine-tuning argument, there is a
simple but prima facie powerful objection to the argument which must be considered. The
objection is that we  know that we exist, and hence we already fully believe that the universe is
life-permitting: P(L) = 1. It automatically follows that P(L|G) = P(L|~G), and hence P(G|L) =
P(G). 
This objection is not adequate as a reply to the fine-tuning argument, because it proves
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too much. There are many cases where we have some evidence E such that P(E) = 1, and yet we
think that E provides epistemic support for some hypothesis H. Perhaps the most famous
example is E being the (true) proposition that the precession of the perihelion of Mercury is 5600
seconds of arc per century, and H being general relativity. When general relativity was proposed,
people already knew what the amount of the precession of the perihelion of Mercury was, and
yet the precession was taken to provide epistemic support for general relativity. This is one
instance of the problem of old evidence.
Note that problem of old evidence wouldn’t arise for an ideal Bayesian agent, because by
definition such agents are logically omniscient. An ideal agent would know about the proposition
H and would assign some probability to H at the beginning of her reasoning process (such as
when she is born). As long as E is evidence in the sense that it wasn’t available to her at the
beginning of her reasoning process, then there will be some time when her prior probability
function is updated by learning E. When she learns E she will immediately see the evidential
connection between E and H, so her probability for H would be adjusted accordingly. Because
the problem of old evidence doesn’t arise for ideal Bayesian agents, it is allowable for a solution
to the problem to deviate from the strict Bayesian rules. Indeed, the solution I will utilize below
does this.
There is no agreed-upon solution to the problem of old evidence, but one standard type of
solution is as follows. (See Glymour (1980, 87-91), Howson (1984, 1985, 1991), Jeffrey (1995),
and Barnes (1999) for some discussions of this solution.) Let P– be one’s prior probability
function, and let P+ be one’s posterior probability function, once one has taken into account that
there is a potential evidential connection between E and H. According to this solution to the
3There is an unpublished paper by Robin Collins, however, where he does utilize the
problem of old evidence approach to the fine-tuning arugment; Collins developed the ideas in his
paper independently of this paper. 
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problem of old evidence, once one learns about the potential connection, one should suppose that
one does not fully believe that E, and revise all one’s probability assignments accordingly, to
generate an ur-probability function P*. One should then set P+(H) = P*(H|E). There are many
cases where P–(H) = P*(H), since in pretending that one does not fully believe that E, that would
generally not influence one’s probability for H. In such cases, as long as P*(H|E) > P*(H), then
P+(H) > P–(H), and E counts as evidence for H. 
One of the drawbacks of the ur-probability solution is that it is not always clear what
values the ur-probabilities should take, especially when one has to make extreme modifications
to one’s opinion, by for example supposing that one does not fully believe that one exists. (For
example, one much-discussed issue is whether one should suppose that one never fully believed
that E was true, or whether one should suppose that one forgot that E was true.) Nevertheless, we
need to have some way of accounting for how propositions like L can count as evidence, and the
ur-probability solution is the best approach available. As far as I know, though, there is no
instance in the literature of a proponent of the fine-tuning argument citing the problem of old
evidence in their discussion of the argument, let alone utilizing the ur-probability solution in
formulating the argument.3 As a result, proponents’ presentations of the fine-tuning argument are
less strong than they could be. 
Here is how the fine-tuning argument goes, utilizing the ur-probability solution. One
starts with an initial probability for the existence of God, P–(G), and one wants to see whether
the fine-tuning evidence is such that the fact that our universe is one of the special life-permitting
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ones provides evidence for G. In short, one wants to see whether P+(G) > P–(G). 
One can start by generating an ur-probability function under the supposition that one
does not fully believe that L. One can assume that P–(G) = P*(G), as is standard in cases
involving old evidence. (I will come back to this assumption later, however.) To establish a
value for P+(G), one can use Bayes’ Rule: P+(G) = P*(G|L) = P*(L|G) P*(G) / P*(L). To
establish a value for P*(L), it helps to note that P*(L) = P*(L|G) P*(G) + P*(L|~G) P*(~G). So
the crucial question becomes: what are the values for P*(L|G) and P*(L|~G)? 
In fact, we don’t need to come up with precise values for those quantities. As long as
P*(L|G) > P*(L|~G), we have the desired result that P+(G) > P–(G). This follows because P*(L)
is a weighted average of P*(L|G) and P*(L|~G), so if P*(L|G) > P*(L|~G), then P*(L|G) >
P*(L). If P*(L|G) > P*(L), then P*(G|L) > P*(G) (from Bayes’ Rule). It would then follow that
P+(G) = P*(G|L) > P*(G) = P–(G), as desired. 
At this point, all the proponents of the fine-tuning argument need to show is that P*(L|G)
is indeed greater than P*(L|~G). Here is where they can appeal to the fine-tuning evidence.
P*(L|~G) is low, because it would take a very special selection of fundamental constants for the
universe to be life-permitting. P*(L|G), by contrast, is high, because one would expect God to
create a life-permitting universe. It follows that P+(G) > P–(G); the fine-tuning evidence does
lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of God.
This is a strong argument for theism. I think that philosophers haven’t always appreciated
how strong this argument is, because it hasn’t been presented in the way that I have presented it
above. In lieu of the appeal to the ur-probability solution to the problem of old evidence, the
fine-tuning argument has been presented in a way such that it’s not clear how probabilities
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involving L are generated; specifically, it’s not always clear how probabilities of the form P(L|X)
can take any value other than 1. (See for example the references cited at the beginning of Section
3.) What I have shown is that, by appealing to the ur-probability solution to the problem of old
evidence, one can present a rigorous version of the fine-tuning argument. 
6. Against the Fine-Tuning Argument.
Since the above version of the fine-tuning argument relies on a subjectivist interpretation
of probability, there’s a sense in which the argument is easy to refute. One simply needs to come
up with a prior and ur-probability function such that P+(G) = P–(G). For an agent with those
probability functions, the fine-tuning argument will not be successful. The important question
though is whether such probability functions are reasonable ones to have. Do reasonable people
who are opposed to the fine-tuning argument actually have those probability functions, or could
they reasonably adopt them? 
For example, consider the option of adopting an ur-probability function such that P*(L|G)
= P*(L|~G). One could hold that P*(L|~G) is high, but this would presumably require rejecting
the fine-tuning evidence. If one sincerely believed that the fine-tuning evidence was faulty, then
it might be legitimate to set P*(L|~G) to be high. Well-known physicist Steven Weinberg could
be one of these people: he has said that he is “not impressed with these supposed instances of
fine-tuning” (1999, 46). But for those who are moved by the fine-tuning evidence, this is not a
live option. 
A different way to get the result that P*(L|G) = P*(L|~G) would be to hold that P*(L|G)
is low. One could hold that – in the absence of belief that the universe is life-permitting – one
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sees little reason for God to create a life-permitting universe. This is how Jan Narveson (2003,
97-9), for example, might respond to the fine-tuning argument. Narveson suggests that, if God
were to exist, the ways of God would be so mysterious that we couldn’t make any reasonable
predictions about what God would or wouldn’t do. Thus, it would be open to Narveson to say
that the ur-probability of a life-permitting universe is the same regardless of whether God exists. 
Even though there’s a sense in which the fine-tuning argument is easy to refute (in for
example the above-described ways), there’s a sense in which it’s not. To be unmoved by the
fine-tuning argument in the ways described above, one actually has to believe that the fine-
tuning evidence is faulty, or one actually has to believe that God would not be expected to create
a life-permitting universe. Since (in my opinion, at least) belief is not a matter of the will, as long
as one does not hold these beliefs, one cannot refute the fine-tuning argument in these ways. In
fact, in my opinion most people would reject those beliefs – most people would find the fine-
tuning evidence at least somewhat plausible, and most people would find it probable that God
would create a life-permitting universe. 
The response I will now give to the fine-tuning argument is stronger than those
considered above, in that it does not involve rejecting premises of the argument that most people
find plausible. The premise of the argument I will question is one that hasn’t been questioned
before, but that’s because the premise isn’t salient unless one formulates the argument utilizing
ur-probabilities. I maintain that for most everyone it is unreasonable to hold that  P–(G) = P*(G),
instead P*(G) should be much lower than P–(G). The reason this is the case is that for most
everyone, beliefs that entail that the universe is life-permitting are part of the evidence people
have taken into account in forming their prior probability for the existence of God, P–(G). (Their
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probability is “prior” in  the sense that they have not yet taken into account the fine-tuning
evidence.) For example, Christians believe in God in part because they believe Biblical accounts
about Jesus, but the existence of Jesus entails that the universe is life-permitting. In formulating
an ur-probability for the existence of God, one cannot take into account Biblical accounts about
Jesus. More generally, one cannot take into account the existence of complex features that Paley
appeals to, like the human eye, one cannot take into account the existence of consciousness, and
so on. One’s ur-probability for the existence of God would have to be founded on the plausibility
of a priori arguments for the existence of God, like the ontological argument, and the plausibility
of arguments which appeal to general features of the universe that don’t entail the universe is
life-permitting, like the cosmological argument. The only types of people for whom it wouldn’t
be the case that P–(G) > P*(G) are those whose sole reasons for believing in God are arguments
like the ontological argument and the cosmological argument. 
Now, recall that P+(G) = P*(G|L). In the previous section, where it was assumed that
P–(G) = P*(G), to establish that P+(G) > P–(G), all we had to do was establish that P*(G|L) >
P*(G). Now, we see that matters are more complicated: even if P*(G|L) > P*(G), it still could be
the case that P*(G|L) = P–(G), and hence P+(G) = P–(G). What one has to establish is whether the
fine-tuning evidence gives one more of a reason to believe in the existence of God, besides all
the evidence one had from before which was based on the universe being life-permitting. 
It turns out that this depends on the details of how one supposes that one doesn’t know
that the universe is life-permitting. (Here and below, I will assume that when one doesn’t know
that P, one knows that one doesn’t know that P, and hence one doesn’t fully believe that P.) I
will describe various scenarios for supposing that one doesn’t know that the universe is life-
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permitting, the first of which is favorable to proponents of the fine-tuning argument, the others of
which are not. I will then argue that there is no conclusive reason to favor one scenario over the
others. 
First, one can imagine that one does not know that the universe is life-permitting by
imagining that one knows the form of the fundamental physical laws of the universe, but one
does not know the values of the constants that are involved in those laws. Before taking into
account the fine-tuning evidence, one might have thought that a wide range of values for the
fundamental constants would allow for a life-permitting universe, but the fine-tuning evidence
shows that that is not the case. It follows that P*(G|L) > P–(G), and the fine-tuning argument is
successful.
Alternatively, one can imagine that one does not know that the universe is life-permitting
by imagining that one knows the number of particles in the universe, what types they are, and
their intrinsic properties, but one does not know the fundamental laws governing how these
particles interact. Or, one can imagine that one knows the density of matter in each region of
spacetime, but one does not know what types of particles exist in those regions, or how they
interact. (There are many other possibilities as well; I leave it to the reader to generate other
options.) On either of these scenarios, there would be many possible universes which are not
life-permitting, and hence one would hold that our universe being life-permitting provides
evidence for the existence of God, in the sense that P*(G|L) > P*(G). But nevertheless, P*(G|L)
= P–(G), because the fine-tuning evidence doesn’t change one’s assessment of the various non-
life-permitting universes one deems possible. In supposing that one knows that various types of
particles in existence, but not the fundamental laws, the fine-tuning evidence doesn’t affect one’s
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assessment of the probability of life-permitting universes. The fine-tuning evidence just focusses
on one particular set of fundamental laws, whereas in the scenario imagined we are allowing for
all logically possible fundamental laws that are compatible with the existence of those types of
particles. Facts about the fundamental constants for our particular laws simply don’t matter in
that case. Similarly, in supposing that one knows the density of matter in each region of
spacetime, the fine-tuning evidence doesn’t affect one’s assessment of the probability of life-
permitting universes. The fine-tuning evidence just focusses on one particular set of fundamental
laws, whereas in the scenario imagined we are allowing for all logically possible fundamental
laws that are compatible with the actual density of matter. In these scenarios, P+(G) = P–(G), and
the fine-tuning argument is unsuccessful.
How should we adjudicate between these various scenarios? The literature on the
problem of old evidence is of no help – there are no agreed-upon prescriptions for how to
generate one’s ur-probability function. The proponent of the fine-tuning argument might attempt
to argue that we should hold the laws of physics fixed, and just vary the values of the constants,
because that will produce possible universes that are most similar to our actual universe. But this
argument is no good – similarity judgements are notoriously context-dependent, and there are
important senses in which a universe with the same number and types of particles as ours, or a
universe with the same density distribution as ours, is more similar to ours than a universe which
differs in the number and types of particles or the density distribution but holds the laws of
physics fixed. I conclude that there is no requirement from rationality or considerations of
reasonableness which forces one to generate ur-probabilities in the way proponents of the fine-
tuning argument want one to. It follows that one is open to generate ur-probabilities via a
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scenario that renders ineffective the fine-tuning evidence. 
The general point is as follows: when faced with the fine-tuning evidence, it is reasonable
to not be surprised. We already knew that there are many possible universes that are not life-
permitting, and yet are similar in certain ways to our actual universe. The fine-tuning argument
encourages us to focus our attention on those possible universes that have the same laws of
physics as ours, but different fundamental constants. But why not focus on those possible
universes that have the same types of particles as ours, but different fundamental laws? Or why
not focus on those possible universes that have the same density distribution as ours, but
different types of particles? Before I was faced with the fine-tuning evidence, I already knew that
our universe was special, in the sense that there are many possible universes similar to ours in
certain ways and yet not life-permitting. I already knew that, if God existed, God would have to
choose to actualize our life-permitting universe from among a sea of similar non-life-permitting
universes. I already knew that, if God did not exist, there’s a sense in which we are lucky that the
universe is life-permitting – there are many possible universes similar to ours which are not. The
fine-tuning evidence doesn’t change any of that, and hence the fine-tuning evidence doesn’t
change my probability for the existence of God.
7. The Many-Universes Objection.
I believe that the reply I’ve given above is the strongest reply one can give to the fine-tuning
argument. It is hard to argue this point, since I’d have to consider all possible stronger replies to
the fine-tuning argument and show that they are all unsuccessful. Instead, I will consider two
prima facie powerful objections to the fine-tuning argument, and I will show that they are
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mistaken. 
The objections are based on the many-universes version of the fine-tuning argument, so I
will start by explaining that version. Sometimes, the fine-tuning argument is construed not as an
argument for theism, but as an argument for the existence of many universes. (See for example
Rees 2000.) The thought is that the existence of our universe, with just the fundamental
constants it has, is highly improbable if there is only one universe, but is highly probable if there
are an infinite number of universes, where different fundamental constants obtain in the different
universes. Thus, the existence of our universe provides evidence for the existence of many
universes.
Now, instead of using the facts about fine-tuning as evidence for the existence of many
universes, one might try to use the existence of many universes as a way of rejecting the theistic
fine-tuning argument. I will examine two ways that one could attempt to do this.
First, one might try to reject the step in the argument which holds that P*(L|G) >
P*(L|~G). Supposing that many universes exist, one could argue P*(L|~G) is high; even in the
absence of a God we would expect there to exist a life-permitting universe. One could argue that
the existence of a God wouldn’t make it any more likely for a life-permitting universe to exist, so
P*(L|G) = P*(L|~G).
The problem with this reply is that it relies on fully believing that there are many
universes. It would seems strange to have such a conviction; to the extent that there is evidence
at all in favor of the existence of many universes, the evidence is weak. But as long as one
assigns a probability less than 1 to the hypothesis that there are many universes, the theistic fine-
tuning argument will still have force. On the supposition that there are many universes, P*(L|G)
4For helpful comments, many thanks to Nick Bostrom, Brian Kierland, Neil Manson,
Lydia McGrew, Tim McGrew, Chad Mohler, Al Plantinga, Ted Poston, and Jessica Wittmer.
Thanks also to the audiences at talks based on previous versions of this paper, at the Society of
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= P*(L|~G), while on the supposition that there is just one universe, P*(L|G) > P*(L|~G); one’s
actual ur-probabilities will be a weighted average of the ur-probabilities obtained on those two
suppositions, and hence P*(L|G) > P*(L|~G).
The second way to attempt to use the existence of many universes to reject the theistic
fine-tuning argument is as follows. One could admit that the fine-tuning evidence seems to
provide evidence for the existence of God, but one could hold that that once one considers the
many-universes hypothesis, it turns out that the fine-tuning evidence provides evidence for the
many-universes hypothesis instead. 
The problem with this reply is that this is not how Bayesian confirmation works. If one
has two hypotheses, H1 and H2, and P(E|H1) = P(E|H2), then it follows from Bayes’ rule that the
ratio of the prior probabilities is preserved: P(H1) / P(H2) = P(H1|E) / P(H2|E). The ur-probability
of the existence of a life-permitting universe is presumably about the same on the supposition
that God exists as it is on the supposition that many universes exist: P*(L|G) . P*(L|M), where
M is the many-universes hypothesis. It follows that P*(G) / P*(M) . P*(G|L) / P*(M|L). Thus, if
P*(M|L) > P*(M), then we would expect that P*(G|L) > P*(G); the evidence confirms both
hypotheses. 
I conclude that the theistic fine-tuning argument is a powerful argument; for example, it
cannot be reasonably refuted by an appeal to many universes. Nevertheless, as described in the
penultimate section, there are ways of resisting its force. It is reasonable to hold that the fine-
tuning evidence does not provide evidence for the existence of God.4
Christian Philosophers conference at Asbury College (December 2003) and at the University of
Missouri at Columbia (February 2004). 
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